Challenges to validity in single‐group interrupted time series analysis by Linden, Ariel
Received: 5 August 2016 Accepted: 8 August 2016DOI 10.1111/jep.12638OR I G I N A L A R T I C L EChallenges to validity in single‐group interrupted
time series analysis
Ariel Linden DrPH, 1,21President, Linden Consulting Group, LLC, Ann
Arbor, MI, USA
2Research Scientist, Division of General
Medicine, Medical School, University of
Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA
Correspondence
Ariel Linden, Linden Consulting Group, LLC,
1301 North Bay Drive, Ann Arbor, MI 48103,
USA.
Email: alinden@lindenconsulting.orgJ. Eval. Clin. Pract. 2017;23:413–418.Abstract
Rationale, aims and objectives Single‐group interrupted time series analysis (ITSA) is a
popular evaluation methodology in which a single unit of observation is studied; the outcome
variable is serially ordered as a time series, and the intervention is expected to “interrupt” the
level and/or trend of the time series, subsequent to its introduction. The most common threat
to validity is history—the possibility that some other event caused the observed effect in the time
series. Although history limits the ability to draw causal inferences from single ITSA models, it can
be controlled for by using a comparable control group to serve as the counterfactual.
Method Time series data from 2 natural experiments (effect of Florida's 2000 repeal of its
motorcycle helmet law on motorcycle fatalities and California's 1988 Proposition 99 to reduce
cigarette sales) are used to illustrate how history biases results of single‐group ITSA results—as
opposed to when that group's results are contrasted to those of a comparable control group.
Results In the first example, an external event occurring at the same time as the helmet repeal
appeared to be the cause of a rise in motorcycle deaths, but was only revealed when Florida was
contrasted with comparable control states. Conversely, in the second example, a decreasing
trend in cigarette sales prior to the intervention raised question about a treatment effect attrib-
uted to Proposition 99, but was reinforced when California was contrasted with comparable con-
trol states.
Conclusions Results of single‐group ITSA should be considered preliminary, and interpreted
with caution, until a more robust study design can be implemented.
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Single‐group interrupted time series analysis (ITSA) is an increasingly
popular evaluation methodology for observational data in which a sin-
gle unit of observation (eg, an individual, a city, or a country) is studied;
the dependent variable is a serially ordered time series, and multiple
observations are captured in both the pre‐ and post‐intervention
periods. The study design is called an interrupted time series because
the intervention is expected to “interrupt” the level and/or trend of
the time series, subsequent to its introduction.1,2 ITSA has been
argued to generally have strong internal validity, primarily through its
control over regression to the mean,1–4 and good external validity, par-
ticularly when the unit of measure is at the population level, or when
the results can be generalized to other units, treatments, or settings.2,5wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/ITSA has been used in many areas of study, such as assessing the
effects of community interventions,6,7 public policy,8 regulatory
actions,9 and health technology assessment.10 ITSA has also been pro-
posed as a more flexible and rapid design to be considered in health
research before defaulting to the traditional 2‐arm randomized con-
trolled trial.11 In addition, systematic reviews of the literature increas-
ingly include studies using ITSA as the primary research design.12
Despite its widespread use, the single‐group ITSA design remains a
vastly inferior evaluation approach to those utilizing a comparable con-
trol group to serve as the counterfactual—a fundamental element of the
potential outcomes framework.13,14 With a comparable control group,
factors other than the intervention that are responsible for shifting
the time series will likely be observed in both groups and thus not mis-
taken for a treatment effect. Moreover, events that affect the time© 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.jep 413
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be used in the matching process to ensure that the shift in the time
series does not confound the results. Conversely, without a comparable
control group, the impact on the time series by an event outside the
intervention may be mistaken for a treatment effect.
Other literature has provided both a comprehensive description of
the ITSA design and methodological guidance in its implementation
(see Box and Tiao,15 Glass et al,16 and McDowall et al17 for using
autoregressive integrated moving‐average models; and Crosbie,18
Gottman,19 Linden and Adams,20 Linden,21 McKnight et al,22
Simonton,23 and Velicer and McDonald24 for using ordinary least‐
squares regression‐based models). The purpose of the current paper,
however, is to offer a nontechnical discussion of how factors that
impact the time series outside of the intervention may be mistaken
for a treatment effect when using the single‐group ITSA model, but
captured when using a comparable control group to serve as the coun-
terfactual. This problem is illustrated using data from 2 natural experi-
ments; the effect of Florida's 2000 motorcycle helmet law repeal on
motorcycle fatality rates, and the effect of California's 1988 Proposi-
tion 99 antismoking initiative on cigarette sales.2 | USUAL THREATS TO VALIDITY IN
SINGLE‐GROUP ITSA DESIGNS
While the single‐group ITSA design can control for many threats to
validity, the remaining threats that the design does not control for
are crucial (see Campbell & Stanley1 and Shaddish et al2 for a compre-
hensive description of the threats to validity in ITSA and many other
evaluation designs).
History is the principal threat to validity—the possibility that some
event other than the intervention caused the observed effect in the
time series.2 There are at least 2 scenarios where the effect of history
may bemisconstrued. First, when the change in the time series is imme-
diate and drastic, it is easy to ignore the possibility that some other fac-
tor may be the cause. And even if there is an alternative explanation for
the effect, information may not always be available to identify those
factors. Thus, the investigator is likely to argue that the effect is causally
related to the intervention without further study. In the second sce-
nario, some factor may cause a directionally correct change in the time
series prior to the intervention. Thus, any additional change in the time
series subsequent to the introduction of the intervention may be
argued to be a continuation or magnified effect of that prior factor
and not a treatment effect.21,25 In either of these scenarios, the inclu-
sion of a comparable control group will clarify these issues.
Instrumentation, or a change in how the time series is measured, is
another threat to validity that may erroneously appear as a treatment
effect in a single‐group ITSA.2 While documentation should be
obtained indicating how and when the instrumentation changed, it
may nevertheless be impossible to control for this bias in a single‐
group ITSA. However, with the inclusion of a comparable control
group, the change in instrumentation should impact both time series
equally, thereby nullifying its effect.
Selection may bias the single‐group ITSA if the serial observations
are cross‐sectional and the characteristics (or composition) of thegroup under study are different before and after the introduction of
the intervention (selection is not a factor in a single‐group ITSA where
the same group, or individual, undergoes surveillance over the duration
of the study). Selection may be controlled for by finding a control
group that is comparable to the treatment group on pre‐intervention
characteristics (at the very least, the groups should be comparable on
the pre‐intervention level and trend of the outcome under study).20,21
Threats to statistical conclusion validity apply as much to ITSA as to
any other design, such as low power, violated test assumptions, and
unreliability of measurement.2 While these issues are important, their
discussion is beyond the scope of this paper (the reader is referred to
references15–24 for a comprehensive discussion of the relevant statis-
tical issues in ITSA models).3 | EXAMPLE 1: THE REPEAL OF FLORIDA'S
MOTORCYCLE HELMET LAW
On July 1, 2000, the State of Florida partially repealed its motorcycle
helmet law by exempting adult motorcyclists (aged 21 years and older)
and moped riders from wearing a helmet—provided that they carry
motorcycle insurance coverage with a minimum of $10 000 in medical
benefits for injuries sustained in a motorcycle accident. The law contin-
ued to require helmets for riders younger than 21 years of age. Several
studies have examined the effect of the Florida helmet repeal on
motorcycle fatalities and have collectively concluded that weakening
of the helmet law led to increased motorcycle fatalities.26–29 A major
shortcoming common to all these studies is that no contrasts were
made with other comparable states.
For the current analysis, all motor vehicle fatality data for all states
were retrieved from the Fatal Accident Reporting System database for
the years 1975 to 2014 (which is all the data available in the system).30
Annual issues of Highway Statistics provided motorcycle registration
data for the periods of 1996 to 2001, and years between 1975 and
1996 were retrieved from the 1995 summary volume.31 Statistical
analyses were conducted using ITSA, a program written for STATA to
conduct single‐group and multiple‐group interrupted time series
analyses.21
Figure 1a presents the raw motorcycle fatality counts in Florida
annually from 1975 to 2014. As shown, motorcycle deaths were
decreasing annually from 1975 until the repeal in 2000, followed
immediately by a sharp jump in deaths that continued to rise annually
thereafter until 2014. Figure 1b presents annual motorcycle fatalities as
a percent of total motor vehicle deaths. The overall behavior of this time
series is nearly identical to that of rawmotorcycle deaths (Figure1a). The
percentage of motorcycle deaths relative to all motor vehicle fatalities
decreased annually between 1975 and 2000, followed by an immediate
(and thereafter increasing) rise.
On the face of it, these 2 figures (Figure 1a,b) lend compelling sup-
port for the hypothesis that Florida's helmet repeal led to increased
motorcycle fatalities—both in raw counts and relative to all other
motor vehicle deaths. Additionally, based on these figures alone, most
relevant threats to validity2 could be ruled out. For example, regression
to the mean can be ruled out as a rival explanation because the lengthy
pre‐intervention time series shows a consistent decrease in
FIGURE 1 Florida motorcycle deaths and registrations from 1975 to 2014, using single‐group and multiple‐group ITSA designs
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the time series immediately following the repeal cannot be viewed as a
response to an outlier observation occurring immediately prior to the
repeal. Selection bias may pose a threat to validity if the characteristics
of those who died after the repeal differed systematically from those
who died prior to the repeal, with the most likely case being made
for more deaths for motorcyclists older than 21 years of age. However,
neither Muller27 nor Kyrychenko and McCartt29 found differential
fatality rates based on the age cutoff. History is a plausible threat to
validity only if another event or action had occurred simultaneously
with the repeal, given that the trend in fatalities was decreasing annu-
ally prior to the repeal. However, given such an immediate and dra-
matic effect on the time series concomitant with the repeal, it may
appear rather unlikely that any other factor could have caused the
effect outside the intervention.
However, Figure 1c and 1d cast doubt on the assertion that the
helmet law repeal caused the increase in motorcycle deaths. As illus-
trated, motorcycle registrations followed a nearly identical historic pat-
tern as motorcycle deaths (with a very high correlation between them
of 0.95). Most notable in this time series is the sharp increase in motor-
cycle registrations commencing in 2000—after many years of declining
rates. In light of these data, one may revise the prior hypothesis to
now consider that the helmet law repeal is associated with more
people registering motorcycles, which in turn is associated with
more deaths.
Figure 1e and 1f offer a complete rebuttal for any causal associa-
tion between Florida's helmet law repeal and the rise in motorcycle
fatalities. In Figure 1e, motorcycle fatalities in Florida are comparedto those of all other States (excluding Arkansas, Kentucky, Michigan,
Pennsylvania and Texas—states that repealed their helmet laws during
some point in the same timeframe under study). The time series were
ipsatively standardized32 so that they could be compared on the same
scale. As shown, nationally there was an even sharper downward trend
in motorcycle deaths prior to 2000 than in Florida. However, similar to
Florida, there was both an immediate and prolonged increase in
motorcycle deaths after 2000. As one can see from the intermingled
observations between the 2 time series, the trends are not statistically
different from each other. Although not shown, national motorcycle
registrations followed a similar annual trajectory to that in Florida.
Thus, one may now further conclude that there was some event that
caused people to register motorcycles in large numbers throughout
the country starting in 2000, and this in turn was associated with
increasing annual motorcycle fatalities.
Finally, one may argue that the comparison between Florida and
all other states is biased because the 2 are not comparable on either
baseline level or trend of the outcome variable.20,21 To address this
concern, an optimal matching algorithm was implemented to identify
states that matched Florida on both baseline level and trend of stan-
dardized motorcycle fatalities. As illustrated in Figure 1f, Nevada and
North Carolina were virtually indistinguishable from Florida across
the entire time series from 1975 to 2014, including, and most impor-
tantly, the year 2000, in which the Florida helmet law was repealed.
In summary, this example demonstrates that a seemingly irrefut-
able treatment effect detected on reviewing data from a single time
series can be disproven when that time series is contrasted with that
of a comparable control group.
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PROPOSITION 99 ANTI‐SMOKING
INITIATIVE
In 1988, California passed the voter‐initiative Proposition 99, which
was a widespread effort to reduce smoking rates by raising the ciga-
rette excise tax by 25 cents per pack and to fund anti‐smoking cam-
paigns and other related activities throughout the state (see Breslow
and Johnson33 and Siegel34 for a comprehensive discussion of this ini-
tiative). Several studies have shown that cigarette consumption in
California after the passage of Proposition 99 in 1988 was lower than
the average national trend and lower than the linearly extrapolated
pre‐intervention trend in California (see Breslow and Johnson,33
Glantz,35 Fichtenberg and Glantz,36 and among others).
Per capita cigarette sales (in packs) is the most widely used indica-
tor of smoking prevalence found in the tobacco research literature37
and serves here as the aggregate outcome variable under study,
measured annually at the state level from 1970 until 2000 (with
1989 representing the first year of the intervention). The current data
were obtained from Abadie et al,38 who obtained the data from
Orzechowski and Walker.39 Eleven states were discarded from the
dataset because of their adoption of some other large‐scale tobacco
control program at some point during California's intervention period
under study between 1989 and 2000, leaving 38 states as potential
controls (Abadie et al37).
Figure 2a illustrates the annual time series of cigarette sales per
capita in California from 1970 to 2000. As shown, per capita cigarette
sales began to decrease in 1976 and continued its downward trajec-
tory until 2000. There does appear to have been an “interruption” in
the time series coinciding with the initiation of Proposition 99, after
which the annual trend decreased more so than prior to 1999.FIGURE 2 Cigarette sales in California from 1970 to 2000, using single‐grGiven that the internal validity of the ITSA design rests on the pre-
mise that the interruption in the time series is associated with the
introduction of the treatment, treatment effects may seem less plausi-
ble if a shift in the time series appears prior to the actual intervention.
Such a shift would indicate that an external factor was already
influencing the time series and imply that any additional shifts may
simply be a continuation of that factor's impact. Using these same
cigarette sales data, Linden and Yarnold25 found that numerous
structural breaks occurred prior to the actual initiation of Proposition
99 in 1989, including perfect structural breaks in 1983 and 1985.
Figure 2b illustrates that the linear trend between 1983 and 1989 is
nearly identical to the linear trend following the introduction of
Proposition 99, casting doubt on whether there was an intervention
effect associated with Proposition 99, or simply an additional
structural break due to some factor outside of the intervention.
Figure 2c illustrates the comparison of California to all other
states that had not yet implemented any anti‐smoking campaign. As
shown, the annual linear trend in cigarette sales after 1989 is decreas-
ing much more so in California than in the other states, pointing to an
intervention effect associated with Proposition 99. However, as in the
previous example, one could argue that the comparison between
California and all other states is biased because the 2 are not compara-
ble on either baseline level or trend of the outcome variable.20,21 To
address this concern, an optimal matching algorithm was implemented
to identify states that matched California on both baseline level and
trend of per capita cigarette sales. As illustrated in Figure 2d, Colorado,
Idaho, and Montana were very comparable to California in both level
and trend of cigarette sales across the entire pre‐intervention period
spanning from 1970 to 1989. However, California's cigarette sales
declined much more so than these control states after the initiation of
Proposition 99, indicating a treatment effect.oup and multiple‐group ITSA designs
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causes a shift in the time series prior to the actual introduction of
the intervention, it raises the concern that any shift subsequent to
the introduction of the intervention, may be related to this prior factor,
rather than the intervention. To control for this confounder, the
treated group's pre‐intervention time series is matched to that of a
comparable control group. The result here was that Proposition 99
appeared to be effective when contrasted to a comparable control
group.5 | DISCUSSION
The 2 examples presented in this paper illustrate how the single‐group
ITSA model can easily provide misleading results about the effects of
an intervention, because the effects of other competing factors cannot
be identified, or controlled for. In the first example, a seemingly
unquestionable treatment effect was reversed when contrasted with
a comparable control group. Conversely, in the second example, a
debatable treatment effect (due to a preexisting directionally correct
trend in the time series) was reinforced when the treatment group
was contrasted with a comparable control group. In short, even with
an extensive number of pre‐ and post‐intervention observations to
control for regression to the mean and other biases, the single‐group
ITSA design may be no better than the simple single‐group pretest‐
posttest design for causal inference. Thus, a more robust ITSA design
must be employed if inferences about the intervention are to be con-
sidered valid and casual.
As demonstrated in the present examples, using a comparable
control group to serve as the counterfactual provides a robust
approach for assessing treatment effects. Only when contrasted with
a comparable control group can the effect of the intervention (or lack
thereof) be isolated from other rival factors. Moreover, other anoma-
lies observed in the time series (such as changes in instrumentation,
selection bias, etc) can alert the investigator to other potential sources
of confounding.
When multiple nontreated units are available, investigators can
choose from at least 3 different matching methods suitable for time
series data. This includes the matching process implemented in the
present examples (ie, finding those nontreated units that are
nonstatistically different from the treated unit on pre‐intervention
levels and trend of the outcome variable),21 a synthetic controls
approach37 or propensity score‐based weighting20 (which can also be
extended to longitudinal data with multiple treated units40 and for cen-
sored data.41,42 The ITSA framework with a comparable control group
can be further strengthened by implementing a cross‐over design,
wherein the groups switch their treatment assignment at a given
time‐point (ie, the treatment group switches to control and the control
switches to treatment), and the outcomes change in accordance with
the exposure to the intervention.
When a control group is simply not available, a version of the
cross‐over design can be implemented with a single group as well.
Here the intervention is administered and withdrawn, repeatedly.
The results may be considered a causal effect of the intervention if
the treatment effect changes in a similar fashion after each successiveadministration. A limitation of any cross‐over design, however, is that it
requires the ability to control the treatment assignment, thereby
restricting its application from most natural experiments (see Barlow
et al43 for many other ITSA design alternatives to improve causal infer-
ence over the basic single‐group design).
In summary, this paper illustrated 2 cases in which erroneous con-
clusions may be drawn about the effectiveness of an intervention
when using the single‐group ITSA design for evaluation. Absent a com-
parable control group as a contrast, there is no assurance that the
effect of external factors have been identified and controlled for. Thus,
the results should be considered preliminary—and interpreted with
caution—until a more robust study design can be implemented. Given
the popularity and widespread use of the single‐group ITSA design, it
is important for investigators to be cognizant of its limitations and to
strive to add features that maximize its validity and improve causal
inference.
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